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This paper considers a monopolist's revenue-maximizing supply of outside paper money in a random-matching model with divisible money and divisible real commodities. 1 Two questions usually arise concerning the private supply of money (Cavalcanti and Wallace 1999a) : Is it feasible and is it optimal? The feasibility question occurs because of the time-inconsistency problem. In models of private money, it has been observed that in the absence of binding money supply announcements, revenue-maximizing policies are timeinconsistent thereby ruling out any unregulated private organization of the market for outside money (Calvo 1978 , Hellwig 1985 , Taub 1985 , White 1999 . In this paper, I show that, even in the absence of binding money supply announcements, a monetary equilibrium with private supply of outside paper money can exist. Concerning the optimality question, I show that any private organization of the market for outside money is suboptimal.
In the absence of binding policy announcements, the existence of a monetary equilibrium relies on two prerequisites that rule out the time-inconsistency problem: public knowledge of the monopolist's trading history and the existence of credible punishment strategies.
Public knowledge of the issuer's trading history is needed so that the issuer can be punished in the future for actions he takes today. Credibility of punishment strategies is essential to eliminate the monopolist's desire to deviate from the announced policy. In the model, if executed the punishment would eliminate any future prots of the monopolist thereby enforcing time-consistent behavior of the monopolist. The notion that the market would discipline private issuers of outside paper money goes back at least to von Hayek (1976, S. 1 Outside money, as opposed to inside money, gives the bearer no legal claim against the issuer and, therefore, the real value of outside money is exclusively determined by the expectations of its real value in future transactions. Hellwig (1985, p. 566!) contains an excellent discussion of the characteristics of outside and inside money.
2 30) who conjectured that "the slightest suspicion that the issuer was abusing his position when issuing money would lead to a depreciation of its value and would at once drive him out of business. It would make him lose what might be an extremely protable kind of business."
The monetary equilibrium of the model is characterized as follows: Initially, the monopolist announces the entire sequence of future money supplies and then o!ers to exchange the initial stock of money for real commodities. Agents accept the initial o!er because there is no record, as yet, about the monopolist's past play. In each subsequent period, each agent accepts monetary exchanges (goods for money) from other agents and from the monopolist if, and only if, the monopolist has not deviated from the announced nonbinding money supply sequence. Thus, if any deviation occurs, each agent refuses to produce for money today and, in fact, in the future. For each agent it is optimal to respond to the revelation of defection by playing autarky if all other agents respond likewise. Accordingly, the monopolist cannot gain by defection, and, therefore, the money demanders' willingness to accept money in the initial period is a best response.
The model of this paper is based on Shi's (1997 Shi's ( , 1999 ) random-matching model with divisible money and divisible real commodities. In Shi's model, the money supply is exogenously given; one contribution of this paper, therefore, is to endogenize the supply of money in the random-matching model with divisible money. The paper is related to several papers that study the private supply of money. Other random-matching models include
Cavalcanti, Erosa and Temzelides (1999), Ritter (1995) , and Williamson (1999). They all study environments with !"#!$!%!&'( money. Nonrandom matching models include Calvo (1978), Klein (1975), and Taub (1985) .
Because of their treatment of the time-inconsistency problem, the models of Cavalcanti 3 and Wallace (1999a) and Ritter (1995) are of special relevance for this paper. Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a) assume that trading histories of bankers, who issue distinguishable !"%!#( monies, are public knowledge, and they show that this knowledge is su"cient to rule out the time-inconsistency problem. They derive the incentive-feasible allocation that maximizes the nonbanking sector's welfare and show that this allocation requires note issue and redemption by the bankers. In Ritter's (1995) model a subset of the population belongs to a coalition that issues at money. The sequence of money supplies is chosen to maximize the coalition members' discounted utility from trading with nonmembers.
He shows that the coalition is able to promise credibly to limit the issue of money if the coalition's involvement in the economy is su"ciently large and if its members are su"ciently patient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 an adapted version of Shi's (1997 Shi's ( , 1999 model is presented; Section 3 considers the monopolist's revenue-maximizing sequence of money supplies when binding money supply announcements are feasible and when they are not feasible, and Section 4 concludes.
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/ 0emand
Money demand arises in the search-theoretic model of monetary exchange where money is used to alleviate the double coincidence of real wants problem. The model builds on Shi (1997 Shi ( , 1999 , who extended the search-theoretic approach developed by Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993) The probability of a single coincidence of real wants is ' $ 1#!.
Each household consists of a continuum of members normalized to one, who carry out di!erent tasks but regard the household's utility as the common objective. Household members are grouped into money holders (buyers) and producers (sellers), each performing one task at a time. A buyer attempts to exchange money for consumption goods, and 5 a seller attempts to produce goods for money. The fraction of buyers is given by the exogenous constant (. 2 Time is discrete and household members are randomly matched in pairs in each period where the probability that a seller meets an appropriate buyer (a buyer of household $ + 1 who holds money) is '(, and the probability that a buyer meets an appropriate seller is ' (1 # ().
At the beginning of each period, the household has ) ! units of money and chooses a uniform consumption level for each member, * ! , and the next period's money stock, ) !+1 .
The household then divides evenly the money stock among its buyers so that each buyer holds ) ! #( units of money in a match and species the trading strategies for its members.
After this, the agents are matched and carry out their exchanges according to the described strategies. Thereafter, members bring back their receipts of goods and money, and each member consumes * ! units of goods. At the end of a period, the household receives money transfer + ! and carries the stock ) !+1 to , + 1.
Utility in a period is given by -**+ # ./ where * is the quantity of goods consumed, / is the quantity of goods produced, and . is the marginal cost of production where . " 0.
The function -is dened on *0% %), is increasing, three times di!erentiable, and satises -*0+ ' 0% -00 0 0, -0 *0+ ' % and *-000 (*) " 2-00 (*). 3 The household discounts future utility with the discount factor 1 " (0% 1).
Denote 2 ! the household's period , + 1 marginal value of money, discounted to period ,. For the sake of simplicity, assume that a buyer who meets an appropriate seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it o!er to the seller, and the seller accepts it if made no worse o! by 2 Shi (1997 2 Shi ( , 1999 ) also allows households to choose the fraction of buyers ! in each period. To focus on the central issue of the paper, the problem of an optimal money supply sequence is examined when the fraction of buyers is given. 3 The last assumption guarantees uniqueness of the monopolist's solution. This assumption, for example, is satised by the utility function " (#) = # ! , where 0 $ % $ 1. 
Because a buyer cannot exchange more money than he has, the o!er (3 ! % 4 ! ) satises
A household's trading strategy consists of the pair (3 ! % 4 ! ) for each buyer, and the numbers 5 ! " {0% 1} and 5 
subject to (1), (2), and
The variables taken as given in the above problem are the state variable ) ! and other households' choices. Inequality (4) species the household's consumption. With probability' (1 # (), a buyer meets an appropriate seller and he receives " ! 3 ! units of goods. Because
( is the measure of buyers per household, ' (1 # () (" ! 3 ! represents the total quantity of consumption goods acquired by the household. Equation (5) species the household's cost of producing for other households and for the issuer. The rst term on the righthand side is the household's cost of producing for other households. A seller meets with probability '( an appropriate buyer and produces 5 ! 6 ! units of goods at cost .5 ! 6 ! .
As the fraction of sellers is (1 # (), total cost for the household is ' (1 # () (.5 ! 6 ! .
The second term species the household's cost of producing for the monopolist. To simplify the problem, note the following: First, inequality (6) must hold with equality if money is valued in the future. Second, inequality (4) holds with equality, given the household's preferences; therefore, * ! can be substituted by the equality of (4) throughout the problem. Third, by the equation (1), 4 ! can be substituted throughout the problem.
Fourth, the other households' choices (6 ! % 7 ! ) satisfy a condition similar to equation (1).
Thus, a household gets a nonnegative surplus when selling; therefore, 5 ! ' " ! ' 1 in a monetary equilibrium. 8 After substituting * ! , 4 ! , and 5 ! , the remaining choice is 3 ! . Let : ! be the shadow price of inequality (2), expressed in period-, utility. Then, if -
, the envelope condition for ) ! and the rst order condition for 3 ! are as follows:
Equation (7) is the optimal condition for ) ! . It states that the marginal cost of acquiring money today, 2 ! , equals the discounted marginal benet of money tomorrow, 2 !+1 , plus the discounted marginal benet of relaxing future cash constraints,
Equation (8) states that, for a buyer in a desirable match, the marginal utility of consumption must equal the opportunity cost of the amount of money that must be paid to acquire additional goods. To buy another unit of a good, the buyer must give up 
The rst part of the denition requires that each household choose a best response against other household choices. Part (ii) states that the equilibrium is a symmetric solution to such best response correspondences, and part (iii) species the exogenously given sequence of money supplies, where ; is the gross growth rate of money. In a symmetric equilibrium, lower-case variables equal capital-case variables and are replaced by the corresponding capital-case variables. Then, equations (7) and (8) give a single condition, which the monopolist takes into account when choosing the sequence of money supplies:
. ¶
If the gross growth rate of money is constant (see Shi 1997 Shi , 1999 , the equilibrium quantity produced in a single-coincidence meeting is the value of 6 that solves
Denote this value by 6 " . Then in a symmetric monetary equilibrium, in each period the buyers make the o!er (6 " % 7 " ! ), which the sellers accept. In this model, money is neutral as the nominal quantity of money does not a!ect real production. However, money is not superneutral. This can be seen from equation (10) , which implies that 6 " is strictly decreasing in ;.
Su55l7
Money is o!ered to the households by a single issuer. The issuer consists of a large number of members called money agents, and the number of members is such that the issuer can assign one member to each seller of each household. Members' preferences for goods are symmetric among goods and satisfy -*6 " + ' 6 " , where 6 " is the quantity of goods consumed. Money agents cannot produce real commodities; rather, they have the technology that permits them to create at no cost, a divisible, durable, and intrinsically useless object called money. Money agents cannot produce real commodities, so no note redemption by the monopolist is feasible. As in Ritter (1995) , the sequence of money supplies is chosen to maximize the organization's joint discounted utility from trading with nonmembers.
Because all money agents are identical and their preferences are linear, this is equal to maximizing the expected discounted utility of a representative money agent.
8indin9 announcements I rst consider the utility-maximizing policy when binding announcements are feasible and, thereafter, I consider nonbinding supply announcements.
In each case each period is divided into two subperiods. At the beginning of a period, household members meet randomly in pairs and carry out their trades; at the end of a period, the issuer assigns one member to each seller of each household, and each money agent makes the same take-it-or-leave-it o!er (6 
Given (11), the lifetime utility of a money agent can be expressed as
If money agents o!er (6
! units of additional currency in each period. Accordingly, the monopolist's problem (thereafter called = <) is to choose the sequence of nominal money supplies
subject to the demand conditions (9), and
Several comments are in order here. First, inequality (13) expresses the fact that money agents cannot produce real commodities and, therefore, cannot redeem money. Second, the sequence of real revenues {(
is homogenous of degree zero in the sequence
. Thus, a proportional change in the money supply sequence has no e!ect on the 5 Throughout the paper I focus on symmetric equilibria where all households are treated equaly that is, each household receives the same take-it-or-leave-it o!ers. Note, however, deviations from such a policy may involve asymmetric o!ers. Given this, if all households are treated symmetrically, the control of the sequence of take-it-or-leave-it o!ers is equivalent to the control of the sequence of money supplies {' " } " "=1 , which in equilibrium equals the sequence of the stocks of money held by each household, {( " } " "=1 .
sequence of real revenues. This is a consequence of the neutrality of money, which is a property of Shi's (1997 Shi's ( , 1999 (9) by < !+1 to get
. ¶ and substitute this expression into the monopolist's objective function. This and equation
(1) yield the modied objective
Maximization of (14) with respect to consumption * ! yields the rst-order conditions
According to equation (15) , in the initial period, the monopolist destroys the value of any old currency (* 0 ' 0) and issues a new money. 6 Thereafter, by equation (16), the issuer earns seigniorage income by taxing (by selling additional units of money) the outstanding stock of money by a constant gross growth rate of money, ;. To derive ;, denote * ! the value of * ! that solves equation (16) and note that (16) implies that * ! ' * is constant. If 6 Without a medium of exchange (' 0 = 0) households do not consume in the initial period because they cannot trade. Although ' 0 = 0 is the maintained assumption, I have set up a more general maximization problem which allows for ' 0 ) 0. If ' 0 ) 0, the optimal policy is to make the initial stock of money worthless (e.g., by announcing to sell an innite amount of the old money) and then to issue a new money.
* ! is constant, the households' rst-order condition (9) implies that ; ! ' ; where ; is the value of ; that solves
Next, note that by (16) -0 (*) " ., which by (17) implies that ; " 1. Shi (1997) shows that the Friedman rule (i.e., ; ' 1) maximizes the utility of the households. Thus, not surprisingly, the monopolist's desire for seignorage income induces him to have too much ination from the households' point of view. For certain parameter values, the solutions to the rst-order conditions (16) and equation (17) involve deation, which violates condition (13). 7 Proposition 1, which takes this condition into account, characterizes the revenuemaximizing policy of the monopolist when binding announcements are feasible. (13) is nonbinding if
7 Deation is more likely the atter the curvature of the utility function. Note further that * is increasing in +, in the single coincidence probability ,, and in the fraction of sellers, 1 # !.
14 Next, note that the right-hand side of (18) is strictly decreasing in 1, that the lefthand side does not depend on 1, and that the solution to the second rst-order condition is independent of 1. Thus, for any * there exists a critical value 1 1 such that (13) (13) is binding. As the rst-order condition (16) is strictly decreasing in *, the optimal policy in this situation is * ! ' e *, for , " 0, where e * is the value of * that satises (18) 
where ; " ' ; if 1 & 1 1 and ; " ' 1 if 1 0 1 1 and the optimal sequence of real commodities demanded from the sellers is
where * " ' * if 1 & 1 1 and * " ' e * if 1 0 1 1 . To derive the optimal sequence of quantities
, note that equation (1) implies that the sequence of shadow prices associatedwith the sequence {<
. From this use (11) The problem with this conclusion is that without specifying the demand for money after each possible history of the game, the question of whether the announced sequence of money supplies {< " ! } ! !=1 is time-consistent or time-inconsistent cannot be answered. Knowledge of the demand for money after each possible history is crucial because this determines the monopolist's expected stream of future revenues after each possible deviation. 9 To 8 Calvo (1978) was rst to point out the time-inconsistency problem of a revenue-maximizing money supply sequence. The optimal solution {'
=1 is time-consistent if for any -0 , ., and
. That is, the optimal solution is time-consistent if what is optimal to do in period -from the vantage point of -0 is also optimal when the point of departure is -0 + . (see Calvo (1978) for this denition). 9 At an abstract level, it should not be surprising that the monopolist's desire to deviate depends essentially on her expectation of the demand for money following any deviation. However, to my knowledge, with the exception of Wallace (1999a and 1999b) , the demand for money after out-of-construct a monetary equilibrium, however, it is not necessary to describe the entire game in detail; it is su"cient to show that a credible punishment strategy exists which eliminate the monopolist's desire to deviate from the announced policy.
For this purpose, denote # " ' {6 
where )
" ! , and 4 " ! solve the representative household's maximization problem described in Section 2, given the announced policy # " , and 5 " ! and
5
"" ! are dened as follows:
The acceptance rule (21) species a seller's behavior when matched with a buyer who makes the take-it-or-leave-it o!er {6 ! % 7 ! }. The seller accepts the o!er if the monopolist's trading history, ? ! , coincides with ? " ! , and if the surplus 7 ! 2 ! # .6 ! is nonnegative. The acceptance rule (22) species a seller's behavior when matched with a money agent who equilibrium moves has, as yet, not been studied in detail. The details of the demand for money are also important to determine quantitively how much the time-inconsistency problem accounts for periods of high ination in countries with poorly designed monetary institutions. This question has been addressed by Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano (1999) . 10 In a more realistic information structure, the monopolist's past play would be revealed with a random delay. For example, one could assume that each period the public record of the monopolist's past transactions is updated with probability / and that there is no updating with probability 1 # /. This implies that the average updating lag is 10/ periods. Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) use this information structure in a model where the past play of each agent is recorded with a random lag.
makes the take-it-or-leave-it o!er {6 Proof: By applying the one-shot deviation principle, I rst show that the strategy prole h# " % $ " i is a Nash equilibrium. First, consider any period , " 0. If 1 " 1 1 , the best response of the monopolist against $ " is {6 exchanges and the monopolist's strategy is # " , then it is a best response to accept money in exchange for real commodities at date ,. Therefore, neither the monopolist nor the household has a protable deviation in any period , " 0. Next, consider the initial period.
Given $ " , the solution to the monopolist's maximization problem PM implies that # " is a 11 Note that h" ! 1 # ! i is not a strategy prole in a strict sense because it does not specify the monopolist's and households' actions if they observe an out-of-equilibrium move of a single household. However, because the measure of a single household is zero and, therefore, deviations of a single household are irrelevant, I ignore deviations of households and focus on out-of-equilibrium moves of the monopolist.
best response against $ " and, by the same reasoning as above, $ " , is a best response against
. Thus, I conclude that the strategy prole h# " % $ " i is a Nash equilibrium.
Next, I show that the strategy prole h# " % $ " i is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
While doing so, I focus on out-of-equilibrium moves of the monopolist because the measure of a single household is zero and, therefore, deviations of a single household are irrelevant.
Consider any out-of-equilibrium move {6 ! }, all households reject money subsequently. Thus, the subgame that starts in the period following this deviation is the autarky equilibrium, and it is well known that the autarky equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of this subgame, in fact, of any subgame, including the whole game. If other households do not accept money, the best response for household $ is not to accept money. Moreover, this best response is independent of the nature of the deviation of the monopolist. ¥ Four comments are required here. First, any deviation by the monopolist triggers complete autarky. That is, every seller in every subsequent meeting refuses to produce for money. For each household it is optimal to respond to the revelation of defection by playing autarky if all other agents respond likewise. Second, if 1 " 1 1 , it is strictly optimal for the monopolist to adhere to the announced policy because she can sell additional money in each period. If 1 ' 1 1 , it is weakly optimal to adhere to the announced policy because the monopolist is indi!erent between adhering to the announced plan and any deviation.
Third, if the monopolist's makes an deviating o!er that yields a strictly positive surplus to the seller's household at today's value of money, it is optimal for the seller not to accept the o!er because of the household's belief that he cannot buy anything with the additional money in the future. Fourth, household must revert to complete autarky whenever the monopolist deviates. Households cannot just stop trading with the monopolist because each household would have an incentive to deviate from such a punishment strategy by accepting additional money from the monopolist.
< Summar7
This paper considers a monopolist's revenue-maximizing supply of outside paper money in a random-matching model with divisible money and divisible real commodities. When binding announcements are feasible, the monopolist's policy is characterized by an initial period where she initiates a currency reform which destroys the value of any old currency, and then issues new money, which she taxes by a constant gross growth rate of money.
The paper shows that even in the absence of binding policy announcements, this revenue-maximizing policy is time-consistent. The time-consistency of the monopolist's policy relies on the public's knowledge of the issuer's trading history and on the existence of a credible punishment strategy. The punishment strategy involves complete autarky that is, each seller in every meeting refuses to produce for money. The punishment is credible because for each household it is optimal to play autarky if all other household respond likewise.
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